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MEMORANDUM FOR LIS PENDENS 
(Filed July 7, 1972) 
RE: STENDIG DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. CITY OF 
DANVILLE 
KNOW ALL MEN that Stendig Development Corporation, by 
counsel, does hereby give notice of lis pendens by this memorandum filed 
in the Clerk's Office of the Corporation Court of Danville, Virginia, on 
the 7th day of July, 1972, by setting forth as follows: There is now 
pending in the Corporation Court of Danville, Virginia, a certain cause, 
the style of which is Stendig Development Corporation v. City of Dan-
ville, a Municipal corporation; the general object thereof being to obtain 
specific performance of an agreement between the said City of Danville 
and the said Stendig Development Corporation, requesting the City of 
Danville to convey title to said Stendig Development Corporation for the 
sum of $32,000.00, all in accordance with advertised request for bids by 
said City of Danv-ille, and the properly submitted high bid of Stendig 
Development Corporation; therefore, subjecting property owned by the 
City of Danville to decree of specific performance requested from said 
Court; the description of said property being as follows: 
All of that property located in the City of Danville, Virginia, near River-
side Drive in said City, and more particularly described as follows: 
Lots 81A and 146A, as shown on Tax Map, sheet 61, bound by 
Hickory Lane on the west, Highland Avenue on the south, Hillcrest 
Road on the east, and Valley Avenue on the north, containing 3-1/3 
acres, more or less, and being all of that property located north of 
the Aiken Bridge commonly known as the SHALE PIT property and 
owned by the City of Danville, Virginia, a Municipal corporation of 
Virginia. 
WITNESS the following signature this 7th day of July, 1972. 
STENDIG DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
* * * 
App. 2 
AMENDED BILL OF COMPLAINT 
{Filed September 21, 1972) 
To The Honorable Stuart L. Craig, Judge of Said Court: 
Your plaintiff, Stendig Development Corporation, respectfully 
represents: 
1. That on August 12, 1969, the defendant herein, the City of Dan-
ville, by Resolution duly adopted by its Council, authorized and directed, 
through its City Manager, that the hereinafter described real estate of 
which it claimed to be seised and possessed in fee simple, be appraised 
and then offered for sale on a sealed bid basis with the right reserved to 
accept or reject any and all bids. Said real estate, known as the "Shale 
Pit Property," situate and being in the City of Danville, Virginia, is more 
particularly described as follows: 
Lots 81A and 146A, as shown on Tax Map, sheet 61, bound by 
Hickory Lane on the west, Highland Avenue on the south, Hillcrest 
Road on the east, and Valley Avenue on the north, containing 3Y2 
acres, more or less, and being all of that property located north of 
the Aiken Bridge commonly known as the SHALE PIT property 
and owned by the City of Danville, Virginia, a Municipal corpora-
tion of Virginia. 
Said real estate had been used by the City of Danville for no purpose 
other than as a borrow pit from which gravel and other material had 
been taken for use in building streets. 
2. Pursuant to said Resolution, the property in question was ap-
praised at $16,650.00. Said property was then advertised for sale by 
sealed bids which were to be received until 5:00 P.M., September 3, 
1969. Your plaintiff, Stendig Development Corporation, submitted the 
high bid in the amount of $32,000.00, which was considerably in excess 
of the appraised value. 
3. No question was ever raised by anyone about the adequacy of 
the amount of the bid of the plaintiff which is the primary reason for 
reserving the right to reject bids in such cases, however, there were two 
questions raised about said high bid. One dealt with whether or not the 
bids had been properly opened and the other concerned the matter of 
whether Stendig Development Corporation should be permitted to bid 
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because of a possible conflict of interest on the part of its president, 
Joseph L. Stendig. 
4. At a special meeting of the Council of the defendant held on 
September 12, 1969, a resolution was offered and seconded that the high 
bid of the plaintiff be accepted with the purchaser willing to take a 
chance on the validity of the deed. The resolution was amended to 
couple with the acceptance a request that the City Attorney present to 
the Court a petition for declaratory judgment on the questions as to 
whether the bids were properly opened and whether or not the highest 
bidder was eligible to bid. The vote on this resolution was: 
Yeas-Six, Nays-Three 
By this six to three favorable vote, the Council of the defendant ac-
cepted the bid of the plaintiff and entered into a contract to sell the 
"Shale Pit" to Stendig Development Corporation. 
5. Notwithstanding this affirmative vote of six to three, being one 
more affirmative vote than necessary to authorize the sale of the Shale 
Pit, (under Section 10 of the City Charter the affirmative vote of only 
five members of Council was required to sell such property) , the City 
Attorney ruled that the vote for the resolution was lost, stating that the 
Charter required seven affirmative votes. 
No motion was made to reconsider the vote on the acceptance of 
the high bid and such action has never officially been reconsidered; if 
in fact an acceptance of the offer of the high bidder, once made, could 
be reconsidered. Council of the defendant apparently assuming that the 
City Attorney was correct and that the vote on the acceptance of the 
high bid had in fact lost, proceeded to consider what action should be 
taken with respect to the bids received for the purchase of the Shale Pit. 
A resolution to reject all bids and to re-offer the property for sale 
at public auction was proposed, but this was rephrased to reject all bids 
and to seek a declaratory judgment on the validity of the opening of the 
bids and on the eligibility of Stendig Development Corporation to bid. 
This was first defeated by a vote of four to five. 
Following a short recess, the following resolution was adopted by 
a vote of nine to nothing: 
"A Resolution Rejecting All Bids For Surplus Property Near 
Riverside Drive And Authorizing And Directing That The Ques-
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tions Concerning The Opening Of The Bids And The Propriety 
Thereof With Respect To The Conflict Of Interest Provisions Of 
The City Charter Be Submitted To The Corporation Court Of Dan-
ville On A Petition For Declaratory Judgment. 
"BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the City of Danville 
that all bids for surplus property near Riverside Drive in the City 
of Danville be rejected and that since a doubt exists in the minds of 
members of City Council as to the City's proper course of procedure 
because of the conflicting claims of the bidders, the City Attorney 
is hereby authorized and directed to submit to the Corporation 
Court of Danville, Virginia the question of the propriety of the 
manner in which the bids for said property were opened and also 
whether or not the purchaser by reason of membership on the Plan-
ning Commission of the City of Danville of the President of the 
corporate purchaser comes within the conflict of interest provisions 
of Chapter 2 Section 19 of the City Charter upon a Petition for 
Declaratory Judgment." 
A copy of the full minutes of the meeting of September 12, 1969, 
are attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
6. Subsequently, on December 14, 1970, said Corporation Court of 
Danville rendered an opinion deciding the two issues submitted to it by 
the City of Danville, favorable to Stendig, specifically that the bids were 
legally and properly opened in substantial compliance with the adver-
tised method of opening and that said Joseph L. Sendig was not in 
violation of the applicable law, the Virginia Conflict of Interests Act. 
Therefore, the determination of the Court on the two issues submitted 
to it by the City resulted in a finding that the bids were properly opened 
and that Stendig Development Corporation was a proper bidder. 
7. If the action of City Council set forth in paragraph 4 hereof did 
not amount to an acceptance of the plaintiff's bid, the action of Council 
set forth in paragraph 5 above did not amount to rejection of the plain-
tiff's bid. Had City Council wished to reject the bid of Stendig Develop-
ment Corporation for any other reason or reasons, it could have done 
so and there would have been no occasion or reason for submitting the 
matter to the Court on the two issues it did. But having decided to go 
to Court, the Council legally and morally committed the City to accept-
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ance of the bid of the plaintiff except for the two matters it thought 
proper to have legally resolved by the Court. There was a meeting of 
the minds of the parties, namely, the plaintiff and the defendant, subject 
to two contingencies, both of which were removed by order of the 
Court. The plaintiff relied on the action of the defendant as well as upon 
the preceding formal action of Council along with the advertisements, 
correspondence and other writings of the defendant and did make its 
acceptance thereto in writing, all of which constituted a legal and bind-
ing contract between the plaintiff and defendant for the defendant to 
convey the hereinbefore described real estate to the plaintiff for the 
sum of $32,000.00, the amount of the high bid. 
8. Once the matters in question had been resolved by the Court and 
there existed no valid or logical reason for the defendant not to pro-
ceed with the sale and direct conveyance of the property to the plaintiff, 
it acted in an arbitrary and frivolous manner by failing to conclude the 
sale to the plaintiff. In this act of abuse of discretion, the plaintiff has 
been denied his equal protection under the law in violation of the Vir-
ginia Constitution and the Constitution of the United States. 
9. That there has been shown nothing improper in the actions of 
the plaintiff who has continued to act in good faith but on the other 
hand, contrary to the presumption that the sovereign is always presumed 
to act in good faith, the defendant has proceeded to further abuse its 
discretion by scheduling a new sale of the property authorized by only 
five votes of its Council. The plaintiff alleges that this act on the part 
of the defendant is illegal and prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiff 
who is already the rightful and legal purchaser of the property. 
10. Your plaintiff further represents that it has always been willing 
and ready to comply on its part by paying to the defendant the amount 
of its high bid upon the defendant delivering to your plaintiff a deed 
for the said premises, in accordance with their understanding and agree-
ment, yet the said City of Danville refused, and still refuses, to comply 
on its part; although the plaintiff is and always has been ready to pay 
the amount of the high bid to the defendant and to fully perform on 
its part. 
Your plaintiff, therefore, prays that the City of Danville may be 
made a party defendant to this bill and be required to answer the same; 
that the said defendant may be decreed specifically to perform the said 
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agreement entered into with your plaintiff as hereinbefore set forth, and 
to make a good and sufficient deed to your plaintiff for the said de-
scribed premises; your plaintiff being ready and willing, and is hereby 
offering specifically to perform the said agreement on its part and 
alleging that it would be inequitable for the defendant to fail to do so 
on its part; and that your plaintiff may have such other and further 
relief as equity may require and to Your Honor may seem meet and as 
in duty bound it will ever pray. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STENDIG DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
* * * 
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EXHIBIT A 
(Filed September 21, 1972) 
A special meeting of Council was held on the above date at 1 : 00 
o'clock P.M. The meeting was called to order by the President and the 
Council Call was read by the Clerk as follows: 
COUNCIL CALL 
Danville, Va., September 12, 1969 
Mr. E. G. McCain 
Chief of Police of the City of Danville 
You are hereby notified that a SPECIAL meeting of the City Coun-
cil of the City of Danville is called to be held in the Council Cham-
ber of said City at 1:00 o'clock P.M. of this date for the purpose of: 
1. Reconsidering bids received for surplus land near Riverside 
Drive 
2. Taking action on Resolution authorizing the City Manager to 
execute pole attachment agreement with Danville Cablevision 
Company 
3. Considering such other matters as may be properly presented 
And to summon the following members of said body to attend said 
meeting. In attestation of each member accepting such summons, 
he is required to acknowledge the same by attaching his signature 
hereto opposite his name. 
MEMBERS 
Dr. D. L. Arey 
Mr. W. Onico Barker 
Mr. John W. Carter 
Mr. Robert H. Clarke 
Mr. Gus W. Dyer, Sr. 
Mr. Charles H. Harris 
Mr. W. C. McCubbins 
Mr. Dan A. Overbey, Jr. 
Mr. F. W. Townes, III 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
SID. L. Arey, M.D. 
SIW. Onico Barker 
SIJohn W. Carter and 
SIRobert H. Clarke 
S/Gus Dyer W. A. Ferguson 
SICharles H. Harris 
SIR. Owen 
SID. A. Overbey, Jr. 
SIF. W. Townes-By B.G. 
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You will also notify the following officials of said meeting, to-wit: 
OFFICIALS PRESS 
Mr. Frank A. Faison, City Manager 
Mr. W. Bascom Jordan, City 
Attorney 
Mr. C. C. Crowder, Jr., Dir. Public 
Works 
Radio Station WBTM 
Radio Station WDVA 
Radio Station WILA 
Mr. V. W. White, City Enginer Radio Station WYPR 
Dr. C. J. Mathes, City Health 
Officer 
and the DANVILLE REGISTER & EVENING BEE 
and COMMERCIAL APPEAL 
SIR. L. Hall S/W. C. McCubbins 
Clerk of Council President 
On Roll Call the following were present. Messrs. Arey, Barker, 
Carter, Clarke, Dyer, Harris, Overbey, Townes and McCubbins (9). 
Absent: None ( 0). 
The invocation was offered by City Manager Faison and was fol-
lowed by a motion by Mr. Dyer, seconded by Mr. Clarke and carried, 
that the approval of the minutes of the meeting of September 9, 1969 
be postponed until a later meeting. 
The first item on the Agenda was reconsideration of bids received 
on surplus land located near Riverside Drive, the bids having been 
considered at the regular Council meeting on September 9, 1969. 
Before discussion commenced, City Attorney Jordan said he would 
like to make a statement. He said that since the last meeting at which 
time a point was raised by Mr. John W. Daniel as to the eligibility of 
the Stendig Development Company's submitting a bid, he had re-
searched the matter. He referred to a letter written by the Attorney 
General of Virginia expressing opinion when an inquiry was made as 
to a member of a County Planning Commission being eligible for ap-
pointment to a School Board, that in his opinion the Planning Com-
mission member is an officer of the County and therefore ineligible. 
Mr. Jordan concluded therefore that since Mr. Stendig is a member of 
the Planning Commission of the ·City he is an officer of the City and 
therefore under the "conflict of interest" section of the Charter is in-
eligible to submit a bid. Mr. Clarke made a motion, seconded by Mr. 
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Overbey and carried that the regular order of business be suspended to 
permit visitors present to be heard. 
Mr. Joe Stendig was the first to speak and asked the City Attorney 
to distinguish between the term ineligible and conflict of interest. Mr. 
Jordan replied that in the terminology of ineligibility it did not infer 
that he had done anythng wrong in submitting a bid. Again Mr. Stendig 
inquired if it would be unfair if the City accepted his bid. Mr. Jordan 
read excerpts from the Attorney General's letter and explained the ap-
plication of the City Charter with that of the State and concluded by 
saying that although he differed with the opinion of the Attorney 
General, he could not override his opinion and say that he is wrong. 
Mr. Stendig again inquired if his bid was acceptable with all mem-
bers voting favorable, would the sale be proper? Mr. Jordan said that 
there could be no exception to the City Charter and referred to the 
specific phrases referring to an "officer" of the City. Mr. Stendig again 
took issue as to the fact that he is an officer of the City and stated that 
the subject of land had never come before the Planning Commission 
and as to conflict of interest he did not believe that such existed. 
Attorney Charles Warren next addressed Council and said that if 
he were in the position of the City Attorney that he would take the 
same stand as to an opinion but that he would like to point out that 
the opinion expressed in the Attorney General's letter is that of only 
one man-a lawyer. Mr. Warren continued by saying that, in his opinion, 
he is in total disagreement with the Attorney General and that he does 
not believe Mr. Joe Stendig is an "officer" of the City since as a member 
of the Planning Commission he serves only in an advisory position with 
no authority. Mr. Warren asked Council to consider the bids on the 
basis of fairness, pointing out that the complainant (low bidder) has 
become a sore loser. He told Council further that 7 votes are needed 
to accept the bid and that the Stendig Development Company will 
take its chances before the Courts as to the value of a deed. He con-
cluded his remarks by saying that he thinks his associate Joe Stendig 
is entitled to such a decision. 
Mr. Stendig said he would like to comment further and pointed to 
objection raised at the September 9th meeting by Mr. John Daniel as 
to the method used in opening the bids. He referred to the advertisement 
as being a loosely drawn press release and there is no ordinance as to 
procedure to follow. He further pointed out that the City Attorney's 
App.lO 
ruling at the last meeting was that the opening of the bids had been 
substantially complied with in keeping with the advertisement. 
Mr. Warren again addressed Council and said that the alternative 
to giving Stendig Development Company sufficient votes in accepting 
his bid would be for the City Attorney to secure a declaratory judgment. 
Mr. Jordan told Council that the basic requirement in seeking a 
declaratory judgment is that bonafide controversy has developed in a 
matter and he indicated that this is certainly true with respect to the 
bids. 
Attorney Huggins addressed Council and said that he had no in-
terest in the matter at all and did not know about the Attorney General's 
opinion but that the bids had been submitted in good faith and since 
the City has nothing to lose he recommended that the matter be sub-
mitted to the Courts for a declaratory judgment. Mr. George Mowbray 
inquired of Chairman Carter if it were not true that after the meeting 
was postponed he was pressured into the opening of the bids by the 
bidders wanting to know the results of the bid. Mr. Carter answered 
Mr. Mowbray in the affirmative. 
Mr. John Daniel defended his request by saying that he only in-
quired of Col. White and Chairman Carter as to when the bids would 
be opened and neither was pushed. He said he was concerned as to 
how and when the bids would be opened. 
Councilman Harris asked Mr. John Daniel if the amount in his bid 
was the amount that he bidded for the property. This was confirmed 
by Mr. Daniel. He ask Mr. Stendig the same question as to the amount 
in his bid being correct and he received an affirmative answer. 
No other person wishing to speak, Dr. Arey made a motion, sec-
onded by Mr. Overbey and carried that the regular order of business 
be resumed. 
Mr. Overbey inquired of the City Attorney if he would favor a 
declaratory judgment. He said that he thought that if there were 7 
favorable votes the City would be taking a chance and subject to a court 
decision if approved. Dr. Arey questioned the City Attorney as to the 
opening the bids and whether or not the Court could render a decision 
as to the validity of the method used. Mr. Jordan said that he supposed 
that such could be included in a petition. Dr. Arey then asked the 
clerk to read the advertisement as published and this was done. 
Councilman Barker said he would like to make an observation, it 
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being that when he heard the City Attorney's opinion it seemed the 
situation had been well answered by the Attorney ·General's letter. He 
expressed appreciation that "things" were on better keel than at the 
last Council meeting. In referring to the broadness of the conflict of 
interest opinion, he said that good Government sometimes keep good 
people out of office and their services are lost. In Danville, he said, we 
need a breakdown as to who is involved in serving on boards and 
commissions so that good people will never decline to serve the City. He 
further expressed an opinion that a declaratory judgment is needed 
in the case of the bids and that he would not like to take the challenge 
of Attorney Warren. He also said that he would not like to take action 
and invite legal proceedings. He suggested that the matter be tabled or 
decision to sell be withdrawn and asked the City Attorney if withdrawal 
offer to sell could result in a declaratory judgment. Mr. Jordan replied 
that the City could get into a position of law as to its reason for rejec-
tion. He also said that Mr. Warren might want the matter adjudicated. 
Mr. Townes inquired of the City Attorney the proper procedure 
to follow whereupon Mr. Jordan replied that the City could make a 
petition to the Court as to whether or not the highest bid is valid. Mr. 
Barker offered a resolution that the bids be rejected and property re-
offered at public auction with the provision in the advertisement that 
the bids would start at $32,000. It was seconded by Mr. Townes. 
Mr. Clarke inquired if such a procedure would be legal. The City 
Attorney told him that it would and read the Charter which requires 7 
favorable votes. Mr. Carter pointed out that if the question is placed 
before the Court positive action will be necessary as there would be no 
controversy if all bids are rejected. 
Mr. Carter offered a substitute resolution, seconded by Mr. Dyer, 
that the property be sold to the highest bidder with the purchaser willing 
to take a chance on the validity of the deed. The resolution was amended 
by Mr. Carter, seconded by Mr. Clarke, that the City Attorney be 
requested to present to the Court petition for declaratory judgment to 
include the question as to whether or not the bids were properly opened 
and second, whether or not the highest bid ( Stendig Development Com-
pany) was eligible to bid. Following clarification of the substitute resolu-
tion, it was ruled that 7 votes would be required for the substitute resolu-
tion and 5 for the original offered by Mr. Barker. Mr. Barker pointed 
out that if the matter is lost in the Court the starting price for the prop-
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erty as included in his resolution would be lost under the substitute reso-
lution. Mr. Dyer commented that he considered the procedure used as 
one of "shopping for bids" after accepting sealed bids. Mr. Barker 
commented that there was such a variance in the bids and appraisal that 
the City should get top value. Dr. Arey said he would have to vote 
against the resolution but if it was determined that the bids were opened 
properly he would reverse his vote. A vote on the substitute resolution 
resulted as follows: 
YEAS: Messrs. Carter, Clarke, Dyer, Harris, Overbey, McCubbins ( 6) . 
NAYS: Messrs. Arey, Barker, Townes (3). ABSENT: None (0). 
(See Resolution No. 69-9.13 copied below) 
The City Attorney ruled that the vote was lost. 
The original resolution of Mr. Barker was considered. Mr. Townes 
said he would like to amend Mr. Barker's resolution to include a request 
that the City Attorney seek a declaratory judgment. The City Attorney 
stated that Council really is getting into a conflict of action. The original 
resolution was restated. The City Attorney suggested that no bids be ac-
cepted while litigation is pending. Mr. Barker rephrased his original 
resolution and moved that all bids be rejected and that a declaratory 
judgment be asked with reason given being opening validity of bids and 
the opinion of the Attorney General with respect to eligibility of Stendig 
Development Company. It was seconded by Mr. Townes and the vote 
resulted as follows: YEAS: Messrs. Arey, Barker, Harris, Townes ( 4). 
NAYS: Carter, Clarke, Dyer, Overbey, McCubbins (5). ABSENT: 
None (0). (See Resolution No. 69-9.14.) 
RESOLUTION NO.~ '69-9.13 
A Resolution To Accept The High Bid Of Stendig Development 
Corporation In The Amount Of $32,000 For The Purchase Of Sur-
plus Property Near Riverside Drive. 
BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the City of Danville 
that the high bid of Stendig Development Corporation in the 
amount of $32,000 for surplus property near Riverside Drive be, 
and the same hereby is, accepted with the understanding that the 
purchaser would defend all actions against said purchase. 
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RESOLUTION NO. '69-9.14 
A Resolution Rejecting All Bids For Surplus Land Near Riverside 
Drive And That The Same Be Re-Offered For Sale At Public Au-
tion Beginning At A Price Of $32,000. 
BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the City of Danville that 
all bids made for surplus land near Riverside Drive be, and the 
same are hereby, rejected; and, 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that said surplus land be re-
offered for sale at public auction with the bidding to begin at the 
sum of $32,000. 
The City Attorney ruled that the resolution was lost. 
Following a short recess, Mr. Carter offered a resolution when busi-
ness was resumed, seconded by Mr. Dyer that all bids submitted be re-
jected since there appears doubt in the minds of some members of Coun-
cil as to whether or not they were properly opened and whether or not 
the highest bidder is eligible to bid. The resolution was adopted by the 
following vote. YEAS: Messrs. Arey, Barker, Carter, Clarke, Dyer, 
Harris, Overbey, Townes, McCubbins ( 9) . NAYS: None ( 0). AB-
SENT: None (0). 
RESOLUTION NO. 69-9.15 
A Resolution Rejecting All Bids For Surplus Property Near River-
side Drive And Authorizing And Directing That The Questions 
Concerning The Opening Of The Bids And The Property Thereof 
With Respect To The Conflict Of Interest Provisions Of The City 
Charter Be Submitted To The Corporation Court Of Danville On 
A Petition For Declaratory Judgment. 
BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the City of Danville that 
all bids for surplus property near Riverside Drive in the City of 
Danville be rejected and that since a doubt exists in the minds of 
members of City Council as to the City's proper course of pro-
cedure because of the conflicting claims of the bidders, the City 
Attorney is hereby authorized and directed to submit to the Corpora-
tion Court of Danville, Virginia the question of the propriety of the 
manner in which the bids for said property were opened and also 
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whether or not the purchaser by reason of membership on the Plan-
ning Commission of the City of Danville of the President of the 
corporate purchaser comes within the conflict of interest provisions 
of Chapter 2 Section 19 of the City Charter upon a Petition for 
Declaratory Judgment. 
* * * 
There being no further business, upon motion of Mr. Clarke, duly 
seconded and carried, the meeting adjourned. 
* * * 
DEMURRER TO AMENDED BILL OF COMPLAINT 
(Filed September 22, 1972) 
The Defendant says that the Amended Bill of Complaint is not suf-
ficient in law for the following reason, to-wit: 
1. Said Amended Bill of Complaint sets forth no grounds for equi-
table relief. 
CITY OF DANVILLE 
* * * 
PLEA OF RES ADJUDICATA 
(Filed September 22, 1972) 
Now comes the Defendant, City of Danville, and says that Plaintiff 
may not maintain this declaratory judgment action against the Defend-
ant on whether or not Plaintiff's bid for the property in question in this 
proceeding has been rejected because in the declaratory judgment action 
heretofore instituted and conducted in this Court, wherein the Plaintiff 
herein was one of the defendants and the Defendant herein was the 
plaintiff, the Court held and decided that the bids submitted by the de-
fendants for the property had been rejected, all of which is shown by a 
copy of the Final Decree of the Court, which is hereto annexed to be 
read and considered as a part hereof. 
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WHEREFORE, Defendant says that said issue in this suit has al-
ready been adjudicated. 
And this Defendant is ready to verify. 
CITY OF DANVILLE 
* * * 
FINAL DECREE ATTACHED TO PLEA OF RES ADJUDICATA 
(Flled September 22, 1972) 
VIRGINIA: 
IN THE CoRPORATION CouRT OF DANVILLE 
City of Danville 
v. 




This cause came on this day to be heard upon the Petition for De-
claratory Judgment and the Exhibits filed therewith; process duly served 
on each defendant; the Answers of defendants, General Development 
Company, Inc. and Stendig Development Corporation; upon the evi-
dence presented ore tenus by the parties; the Briefs of General Develop-
ment Company, Inc. and Stendig Development Corporation and the 
reply Brief of General Development Company, Inc.; and was argued by 
counsel. 
And It Appearing To The Court, concerning the question of the 
way the bids of the defendants were opened, that there was no bad faith, 
fraud or breach of integrity on the part of any person involved in the 
opening thereof and that any irregularity as to the opening by reason of 
the variance between the method of opening and the advertised pro-
cedure for opening said bids was inconsequential and harmless in result; 
And It Further Appearing To The Court that the question of a pos-
sible conflict of interests as to the bid made by Stendig Development 
Corporation acting through its President, Joseph L. Stendig, has, since 
the filing of this suit, been resolved and rendered moot by the enactment 
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by the General Assembly of Virginia at its 1970 Session, the Virginia 
Conflict of Interests Act, §§ 2.1-34 7 through 2.1-358 of the Code of Vir-
ginia, which Act repealed and superseded § 19 of Chapter II of the 
Charter of the City of Danville and all other Acts, Charter provisions 
and ordinances in conflict therewith, and since the bids in question were 
rejected by plaintiff and further action is necessary by the Council of 
the City of Danville before the property can be sold; 
The Court doth Adjudge, Order and Decree that the first question 
set out in the Petition for Declaratory Judgment is answered in the af-
firmative in that the bids were opened in substantial compliance with 
the advertised method of opening; that the second question has been 
resolved and rendered moot since the filing of the Petition herein by the 
enactment of the Virginia Conflict of Interests Act, supra, and that the 
bids submitted by the defendants for the property which is the subject 
of this suit having been rejected by the Council of the City of Danville, 
Council now has the option to rescind its rejection and accept the higher 
bid of Stendig Development Corporation or to ask for new bids to begin 
at $32,000, the amount of the existing high bid, either at public auction 
or by sealed bid and that acceptance of the existing bid or any new bid 
made by Joseph L. Stendig, acting for Stendig Development Corporation 
while he is at the same time a member of the Planning Commission of 
the City, would not, by reason of the Conflict of Interests Act, be a con-
flict of interest. 
And It Further Appearing that this suit should be dismissed at 
plaintiff's costs and removed from the docket; 
It is further Ordered that this cause be, and it hereby is, dismissed 
at plaintiff's costs and removed from the docket. 
To all of which, both defendants, by counsel, except. 
* * * 
SPECIAL PLEA IN BAR TO AMENDED BILL OF COMPLAINT 
(Filed September 22, 1972) 
Now comes the Defendant, City of Danville, and says that Plaintiff 
is barred from the remedy it seeks by its Amended Bill of Complaint 
filed in this cause for the reasons as follows : 
1. As stated in Paragraph 1 of the Amended Bill of Complaint, 
City Council did on August 12, 1969 adopt Resolution No. 69-8.3 au-
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thorizing the sale of the "Shale Pit" property. A copy of said resolution 
is hereto attached as Exhibit "A." 
2. As implied in Paragraph 5 of the Amended Bill of Complaint by 
the reference to § 10 of the City Charter,§ 10 of Chapter II of the City 
Charter does provide that no ordinance shall be adopted by the Council 
unless it shall have received the affirmative votes of at least five mem-
bers. (Emphasis added.) Pursuant to this authority of the City Charter 
and also § 125 of the Constitution of Virginia ( 1902), City Council on 
April 11, 1955 adopted an ordinance amending and reordaining § 2-17 
of the City Code to provide that no ordinance or resolution selling any 
public property shall be valid unless the same be passed by the Council 
by a recorded affirmative vote of three-fourths of members elected to 
the Council. (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, the resolution referred 
to in Paragraph 4 of the Amended Bill of Complaint introduced on Sep-
tember 12, 1969 was lost because the required affirmative vote of three-
fourths of the members elected to the Council (seven votes) was not re-
ceived. The vote of six to three was one vote short of that required for 
passage of the resolution to sell public property. A copy of the aforesaid 
resolution amending and reordaining § 2-17 is hereto attached as Exhibit 
"B." 
3. As stated in Paragraph 5 of the Amended Bill of Complaint, no 
motion to reconsider the aforesaid defeated resolution has ever been 
made and neither has there ever been seven affirmative votes of Council 
on a resolution to sell the "Shale Pit" to anybody whomsoever. 
4. Contrary to the allegation in Paragraph 7 of the Amended Bill 
of Complaint, Council on September 12, 1969 adopted Resolution No. 
69-9.15 rejecting all bids, including that of Joseph L. Stendig for the 
"Shale Pit" property. A copy of said resolution is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "C." 
5. Contrary to the allegation in Paragraph 8 of the Amended Bill 
of Complaint, all bids for the property were rejected as aforesaid, be-
cause there existed in the minds of the members of City Council a doubt 
as. to the City's proper course of procedure. Because of the conflicting 
claims of the bidders, Council by said resolution also authorized that two 
questions be submitted to the Corporation Court of Danville in a Petition 
for Declaratory Judgment, which was done under the style of a case 
App.18 
City of Danville v. General Development CompanyJ Inc. and Stendig 
Development CorporationJ as follows: 
FIRST: Was the opening of the bids for the sale of the prop-
erty in question by the Chairman of the Finance Committee in the 
presence of the City Clerk a substantial compliance with the adver-
tised method of opening the bids? 
SECOND: Is the president of Stendig Development Corpora-
tion, the said Joseph L. Stendig, in violation of the conflict of in-
terest provisions of§ 19 of Chapter 2 of the Charter of the City of 
Danville by reason of his bidding on property being sold by the City 
while he was at the same time a member of the City Planning Com-
mission? 
6. By Final Decree entered in said case on December 14, 1970, the 
Court answered said two ( 2) questions in the following terms: 
AND IT APPEARING TO THE COURT, concerning the 
question of the way the bids of the defendants were opened, that 
there was no bad faith, fraud or breach of integrity on the part of 
any person involved in the opening thereof and that any irregularity 
as to the opening by reason of the variance between the method of 
opening and the advertised procedure for opening said bids was in-
consequential and harmless in result; 
AND IT FURTHER APPEARING TO THE COURT that 
the question of a possible conflict of interests as to the bid made 
by Stendig Development Corporation acting through its President, 
Joseph L. Stendig, has, since the filing of this suit, been resolved and 
rendered moot by the enactment by the General Assembly of Vir-
ginia at its 1970 Session, the Virginia Conflict of Interests Act, 
§§ 2.1-347 through 2.1-358 of the Code of Virginia, which Act re-
pealed and superseded § 19 of Chapter II of the Charter of the City 
of Danville and all other Acts, Charter provisions and ordinances in 
conflict therewith, and since the bids in question were rejected by 
plaintiff and further action is necessary by the Council of the City 
of Danville before the property can be sold; 
The Court doth ADJUDGE, ORDER and DECREE that the 
first question set out in the Petition for Declaratory Judgment is 
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answered in the affirmative in that the bids were opened in sub-
stantial compliance with the advertised method of opening; that the 
second question has been resolved and rendered moot since the 
filing of the Petition herein by the enactment of the Virginia Con-
flict of Interests Act, supra, and that the bids submitted by the de-
fendants for the property which is the subject of this suit having 
been rejected by the Council of the City of Danville, Council now 
has the option to rescind its rejection and accept the higher bid of 
Stendig Development Corporation or to ask for new bids to begin 
at $32,000, the amount of the existing high bid, either at public 
auction or by sealed bid and that acceptance of the existing bid or 
any new bid made by Joseph L. Stendig, acting for Stendig De-
velopment Corporation while he is at the same time a member of 
the Planning Commission of the City, would not, by reason of the 
Conflict of Interests Act, be a conflict of interest. 
7. Said Decree decided that Plaintiff's bid had been rejected and 
gave Council two (2) options as to how it could dispose of the property 
in question in the following terms: 
(a) Council now has the option to rescind its rejection and accept 
the higher bid of Stendig Development Corporation, or 
(b) Ask for new bids to begin at $32,000, the amount of the exist-
ing high bid, either at public auction or by sealed bid. 
8. At its regular May meeting, 1972, held on May 9, Council by 
duly authorized majority vote adopted Resolution No. 72-5.16, by which 
the City Manager was directed to offer for sale on Saturday, July 8, 
1972, at public auction, subject to the confirmation of Council, the sur-
plus property of the City near Riverside Drive, known as the "Shale 
Pit"; the bidding at said sale to start at $32,000 pursuant to the express 
authorization given to it by option (b) in the aforesaid Decree. In so 
doing, Council acted within the letter of one of the options given to it by 
the Court. A copy of the aforesaid resolution is attached hereto as Ex-
hibit "D." 
9. At the aforesaid sale held on July 8, 1972, General Development 
Company, Inc. made the high bid of $51,000, which bid is subject to 
confirmation of Council pursuant to the terms of the ordinance aforesaid 
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by which said property was offered for sale. Council has not acted on 
that bid. 
10. In offering said property for sale at public auction Council 
acted not upon any presumption of law, but rather pursuant to the ex-
pressed authority of this Court and in so doing violated the rights of no 
person and acted neither arbitrarily nor in a frivolous manner. There-
fore, no constitutional question can possibly be involved in this suit other 
than the § 125 question hereinbefore mentioned. 
And this the City of Danville is ready to verify. 
CITY OF DANVILLE 
* * * 
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EXHIBIT A 
(Filed September 22, 1972) 
PRESENTED: August 12, 1969 
ADOPTED: August 12, 1969 
RESOLUTION NO. 69-8.3 
A Resolution Authorizing City Manager To Secure Appraisals Of 
Surplus Real Estate Owned By The City At The North End Of The 
New Broad Street Bridge; Further Authorization To City Manager To 
Offer Same For Sale On Sealed Bid Basis With Council Reserving The 
Right To Accept Or Reject Any And All Bids. 
BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the City of Danville that the 
City Manager is hereby authorized and directed to secure appraisals on 
the surplus real estate owned by the City at the North end of the new 
Broad Street Bridge; and, 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the City Manager is hereby 
further authorized and directed to offer same for sale on a sealed bid 
basis, such proposal for sale to include within the terms thereof the pro-
vision that Council shall and does reserve the right to accept or reject 
any and all bids. 
* * * 
App. 22 
EXHmiT B 
(Filed September 22, 1972 
PRESENTED AND ADOPTED: April11, 1955 
An Ordinance To Amend AndRe-Ordain Section 2-17 Of The 
Code Of The City Of Danville, Virginia, 1952 
* * * * * * 
BE IT ORDAINED by the Council of the City of Danville that 
Section 2-17 of the Code of the City of Danville, Virginia, 1952, be and 
the same is hereby amended and re-ordained so as to read as follows : 
Sec. 2-17. Disposition of public property; franchises. 
No ordinance or resolution selling any public property shall be valid 
unless the same be passed by the council by a recorded affirmative vote 
of three-fourths of members elected to the council. 
No franchise, lease or right of any kind to the use of any such public 
property in a manner not permitted to the general public shall be granted 
for a period of over thirty years. Before granting such franchise or privi-
lege for a term of thity years, except for a trunk railway, bids therefor 
shall be advertised once a week for four successive weeks in a newspaper 
published in the city. Such grant, and any contract in pursuance thereof, 
may provide that upon the termination of the grant, the plant, as well as 
the property, if any, of the grantee in the streets, avenues and other pub-
lic places, shall thereupon, without compensation to the grantee, or upon 
the payment of a fair valuation therefor, be and become the property 
of the city, but that the grantee shall be entitled to no payment by rea-
son of the value of the franchise. Every such grant shall specify the mode 
of determining any valuation therein provided for and shall make ade-
quate provision by way of forfeiture of the grant, or otherwise, to secure 
efficiency of public service at reasonable rates, and the maintenance of 
the property in good order throughout the term of the grant. 
* * * 
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EXHIBIT C 
(Filed September 22, 1972) 
PRESENTED: September 12, 1969 
ADOPTED: September 12, 1969 
RESOLUTION NO. 69-9.15 
A Resolution Rejecting All Bids For Surplus Property Near River-
side Drive And Authorizing And Directing That The Questions Con-
cerning The Opening Of The Bids And The Property Thereof With 
Respect To The Conflict Of Inteerst Provisions Of The City Charter Be 
Submitted To The Corporation Court Of Danville On A Petition For 
Declaratory Judgment. 
BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the City of Danville that all 
bids for surplus property near Riverside Drive in the City of Danville 
be rejected and that since a doubt exists in the minds of members of 
City Council as to the City's proper course of procedure because of the 
conflicting claims of the bidders, the City Attorney is hereby authorized 
and directed to submit to the Corporation Court of Danville, Virginia 
the question of the propriety of the manner in which the bids for said 
property were opened and also whether or not the purchaser by reason 
of membership on the Planning Commission of the City of Danville of 
the President of the corporate purchaser comes within the conflict of 
interest provisions of Chapter 2 Section 19 of the City Charter upon a 
Petition for Declaratory Judgment." 
* * * 
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EXHIBIT D 
{Filed September 22, 1972) 
PRESENTED: May 9, 1972 
ADOPTED: May 9, 1972 
RESOLUTION NO. 72-5.16 
A Resolution Directing City Manager To Offer For Sale At Public 
Auction, Subject To Confirmation, Surplus Property Of The City Near 
Riverside Drive Known As "The Shale Pit." 
BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the City of Danville that the 
City Manager be, and he hereby is, directed to offer for sale on Saturday, 
July 8, 1972, at public auction, subject to confirmation of Council, the 
surplus property of the City near Riverside Drive known as "the shale 
pit"; the bidding at said sale to start at $32,000 pursuant to the order of 
the Corporation Court of Danville entered December 14, 1970 in the 
case of City of Danville v. General Development Company~ Inc., et al. 
* * * 
ORDER 
Entered September 27, 1972 
This day came the parties by counsel on the pleadings heretofore 
filed, and it is agreed that the Special Plea filed by the City of Danville 
shall also be considered as an answer. 
It is further stipulated and agreed that no proof will be required 
of the following: Minutes of Council of the City of Danville for August 
12, 1969, September 9, 1969, September 12, 1969; and that the Declara-
tory Judgment rendered in the case of City of Danville v. General De-
velopment Company, Inc. and others shall be considered as part of the 
record in this case. It is further stipulated that§ 2-17 of the Code of the 
City of Danville and provisions of the Charter of the City of Danville, 
Chapter I § 4 subsection 52 and Chapter II § 10, shall likewise be con-
sidered without further proof. It is further stipulated and agreed that 
the property in question was heretofore used by the City of Danville for 
the purpose of obtaining gravel and for fill dirt and that the same was 
later graded by the City with the intention of selling same. 
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The Court having heard argument of counsel doth postpone de-
cision, and the City shall file authorities not later than the 14th day of 
October and the plaintiff shall reply thereto not later than the 25th day 
of October. 
ENTER this 27th day of September, 1972. 
* * * 
EXCERPT FROM DANVILLE CI'IY CHARTER 
(Filed September 27, 1972) 
Chapter 1, Section 4, Sub-section 52: 
"Acquisition, disposition, etc., of property generally. The city shall 
have, for the purpose of carrying out any of its powers and duties, power 
to acquire by gift, bequest, purchase or lease, and to own and make use 
of, within and without the city, lands, buildings, other structures and 
personal property, including any interest, right, estate or easement there-
in, and in acquiring such property to exercise, within and without the 
city, the right of eminent domain as hereinafter provided in this chapter; 
and to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the same." 
Chapter 2, Section 10: 
"Adoption Of Ordinances, Etc., At Meetings Open To Public; 
Voting Procedure Generally; Members With Financial Interest In 
Question Not To Vote; Reconsideration Of Vote At Special Meet-
mg. 
No ordinance, resolution, motion or vote shall be adopted by the 
council, except at a meeting open to the public and, except motions to 
adjourn, to fix the time and place of adjournment, and other motions of 
a purely procedural nature, unless it shall have received the affirmative 
votes of at least five members. All voting except on procedural motions 
shall be by roll call and the ayes and noes shall be recorded in the jour-
nal. No member of the council shall participate in the vote of any ordi-
nance, resolution, motion or vote in which he, or any person, firm or 
corporation for which he is attorney, officer, director, employee or agent, 
has a financial interest other than as a minority stockholder of a corpora-
tion or as a citizen of the city. No vote shall be rescinded or reconsidered 
at any special meeting unless at such special meeting there be then pres-
ent as many members as were present when such vote was taken." 
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MEMORANDUMOPUUON 
(Entered November 17, 1972) 
Stendig Corporation, ( Stendig), filed its bill against the City of 
Danville for specific performance of an alleged valid offer, acceptance 
and contract by the City of Danville (City) for sale of a lot near Aiken 
Bridge commonly known as the "Shale Pit". It is contended by Stendig 
that on September 3, 1969, he submitted the highest bid of $32,000.00 
for the said property which was accepted by resolution of the Council of 
the City on September 12, 1969, by a vote of six to three, and that the 
action of the Council in determining the resolution was not adopted since 
a three-fourths vote of the Council was determined to be required was 
error, and that another resolution of the same, rejecting all bids and seek-
ing declaratory judgment on the questions therein contained, did not 
amount to a rejection of the bids. The City has contended by special 
pleas of Res Adjudicata and a special plea involved to the effect that the 
rejection has been determined in a declaratory proceeding of December 
14, 1970, by the Corporation Court of Danville, and that three-fourths 
majority is required under Section 25 of the Constitution of Virginia, 
then in effect, and Section 2-17 of the City Code. 
There was general agreement as to the facts in this case and in oral 
argument the Court was requested to determine all questions which could 
be raised and to consider the pleas as answers. Susbsequently written 
memorandums were filed. In order to clarify the matter it might be well 
to set out the material facts which are generally agreed upon since the 
Court made a memorandum of the same, and this will also clarify the 
Court's opinion. 
The City is the owner of the land known as "Shale Pit" acquired by 
the City for the purpose of and used to secure gravel, and also for fill 
dirt. This property has been declared no longer necessary for City pur-
poses, and by resolution of August 12, 1969, (Exhibit No. 1), the City 
Manager was authorized to have the property appraised and offer the 
same for sale by sealed bids, with right reserved in the Council to reject 
or accept the bids. 
The land was appraised at $16,650.00 and offered for sale. The 
highest bid was made by Stendig at $32,000.00, which bid along with 
others was received on September 3, 1969. The next highest bid was 
made by General Development Corporation (General Development). 
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At a Council meeting held on August 12, 1969, for the purpose of con-
sidering said offers, there was considerable discussion and questions raised 
as to an irregularity in opening the bids and whether or not a conflict of 
interest existed on the part of Stendig. (See Exhibit A attached to 
amended bill as to discussions and actions taken by the Council as herein 
outlined.) After considerable discussion a resolution was offered that 
the bids be rejected and the land re-offered for sale, beginning with 
Stendig's bid of $32,000.00. Then there was a substitute motion that the 
Stendig bid be accepted with certain conditions attached. The substi-
tute motion was first submitted resulting in six affirmative votes and 
three negative. The City Attorney ruled that a three-fourths vote was 
required to approve and it was then determined that the motion was lost. 
The original motion was then put and defeated by a six to zero vote. The 
substitute resolution is the one now in question and is here set forth in 
full, omitting the caption: 
"BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the City of Danville 
that the high bid of Stendig Development Corporation in the 
amount of $32,000, for surplus property near Riverside Drive be, 
and the same hereby is, accepted with the understanding that the 
purchaser would defend all actions against said purchase." 
Fallowing a recess Council by a unanimous vote of nine to zero 
adopted the following resolution: 
"BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the City of Danville 
that all bids for surplus property near Riverside Drive in the City 
of Danville be rejected and that since a doubt exists in the minds of 
members of City Council as to the City's proper course of procedure 
because of the conflicting claims of the bidders, the City Attorney 
is hereby authorized and directed to submit to the Corporation 
Court of Danville, Virginia the question of the propriety of the 
manner in which the bids for said property were opened and also 
whether or not the purchaser by reason of membership on the Plan-
ning Commission of the City of Danville of the President of the 
corporate purchaser comes within the conflict of interest provisions 
of Chapter 2 Section 19 of the City Charter upon a Petition for 
Declaratory Judgment." 
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In accordance with the last resolution the City Attorney filed for a 
declaratory judgment in the Corporation Court of the City, with General 
Development and Stendig parties thereto. On December 14, 1970, the 
Court rendered a decision holding there was no material irregularity in 
opening of the bids; that the conflict of interest question was moot in 
view of an amendment to the Conflict of Interest Act by the 1970 Legis-
lature, and further in its decree stated, "The bids submitted by the de-
fendants (General Development and Stendig) for the property which is 
the subject of this suit having been rejected by the Council of the City 
of Danville, Council now has the option to rescind its rejection and ac-
cept the highest bid of Stendig Development Corporation or ask for new 
bids beginning at $32,000, the amount of the existing high bid, either 
at public auction or sealed bids." 
The City acting on the decree determined by its resolution of May 9, 
1972, offered the property for sale at public auction, "the bidding at said 
sale to start at $32,000 pursuant to order of the Corporation Court of 
Danville", which sale was held on July 8, 1972, and General Develop-
ment made the highest bid of .$51,000. No action has been taken on this 
offer, presumably pending outcome of this proceeding. This proceeding 
was instituted on July 7, 1972, by service on the City of Danville At-
torney, and on motion of complainant on September 22, 1972, filed its 
amended bill which has been answered by the City. 
On April11, 1955, the City adopted an ordinance, Section 2-17, of 
the Code of the City of Danville, to the following effect: 
Section 2-17 Disposition of Public Property; Franchises 
"No ordinance or resolution selling any public property shall be 
valid unless the same be passed by the Council by recorded affirma-
tive vote of three-fourths of members elected to the Council." 
Section 125 of the Constitution of Virginia then in effect, which is 
now Section 9 of Article VII Constitution 1971, provides that "the rights 
of no city or town in and to its water front, wharf property, public land-
ings, wharves, docks, streets, avenues, parks, bridges and other public 
places, and its gas, water and electric works shall not be sold, except by 
an ordinance or resolution passed by a recorded affirmative vote of three-
fourths of all members elected to the Council. . . . " (Italics supplied) 
Acting on the City Ordinance and the Constitution the City At-
torney advised the Council that the resolution accepting the Stendig bid 
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had not been passed but was rejected. It is now contended by Stendig 
that the City Ordinance was intended to comply with the Constitution 
and that the use of the word "public property" in the ordinance should 
be construed as "other public places" as set out in the Constitution, and 
that the "Shale Pit" property was not "other public places" property 
requiring a three-fourths vote. 
Assuming, but not deciding, that the opinion of the Attorney was in 
error, the Council and all interested parties concurred in his decision and 
acted on that interpretation and accepted the same as being correct. If 
the City Attorney was incorrect in his interpretation of the law, all parties 
having acted raises a mistake of law. 
A mistake made with a knowledge of every fact necessary to be 
known to form a corre~t conclusion as to the question to be decided is a 
mistake of law consisting in an erroneous legal deduction from existing 
facts, and cannot, unless accompanied with imposition, misrepresenta-
tion, undue influence, misplaced confidence or surprise, furnish grounds 
for the interposition for a court of equity. 13 Mich. Dig. 138 "Mistake 
of Law"; Piedmont Trust Bank v. Aetna Casualty, etc. 210 Va. 396, 
( 1969). 
Stendig, the City, and ·General Development were all present at the 
Council meeting on September 12, 1969, all were represented by attor-
neys, there was no dispute as to the facts and no objection of any kind 
was made to the City Attorney's ruling, or action by the Council there-
after, and the ruling has been accepted by Stendig without any objection 
until the property was offered for sale, a period from September 12, 
1969, until July 7, 1972, when this proceeding was filed. The Council 
acted upon the Attorney's advice and declared the resolution to accept 
the Stendig bid rejected, and the resolution rejecting all bids was passed .. 
In the Declaratory Judgment proceeding by the City, the question 
was not raised nor were the proceedings therein objected to, nor the de-
cree entered on December 14, 1970. In the decision it was recognized 
by the Court that the City had rejected all bids and laid down rules 
which might govern the City in event further action was desired, all of 
which was acquiesced in by Stendig, a party thereto. 
Stendig without objection, permitted the property to be offered for 
sale commencing with his original offer of $32,000, and acquiesced in the 
action of the City in acting under the procedures as outlined in the de-
cree of the Court of the Declaratory Judgment which was tantamount to 
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making an offer on the property, and had no increase bid been made his 
bid would probably have been accepted, or at least he certainly indicated 
his desire that it be accepted since he says in the proceedings here that 
the bid had never been withdrawn. 
It is also interesting that after the property had been advertised 
for sale commencing with his bid, Stendig elected almost on the date 
the bids were to be received to file the suit for specific performance. He 
had a right and the proper proceeding would probably have been to 
enjoin the sale by the City of Danville, if he considered a contract had 
been entered into and that his bid had been accepted on December 12, 
1969. 
Stendig has acquiesced in everything that has taken place from the 
first offer for sale of the property in question down to and through the 
advertisement of the second sale, permitting his bid to be used as starting 
bid, and it appears to the Court that he is estopped from any further 
proceedings. 
The Council may have acted under a mistaken view of the law; 
however, they did act and rejected all bids, which they had a right to do. 
It will be noted that the original sale by sealed bids provided that 
the Council had the right to reject or accept all offers. The Council by 
nine to zero vote, or a unanimous vote, did reject all bids. There is some 
mention that no motion was made to reconsider the first resolution above 
mentioned. The Court does not think this is a valid ground. All reso-
lutions were acted upon at the same meeting and Stendig was repre-
sented 
It would further be noted that there is nothing in the Constitution 
to prevent the City from passing a resolution or ordinance providing for 
the sale of "public property", and the Court is of the opinion that the 
Council had a right to pass the ordinance which is valid and does not 
contravene the Constitution. 
It is singular to note that in the case of Town of Victo-ria v. Ice, 
Etc. Co. 134 Va. 124, when Section 125 of the Constitution was being 
considered it was said on page 128 that the Court said "The section 
clearly limits the powers of the City Council, and the first clause directs 
the mode of procedure when it undertakes to sell the public property of 
a municipality of the character thereby designated", and further makes 
reference to the sales of public property. While this is pure dictum, it is 
interesting to note that the Supreme Court referred to the Section as 
effecting public property. There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent 
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a Council from providing for sale of public property by a· proper ordi· 
nance duly enacted. 
Other questions raised are not necessary to be decided as it can be 
clearly seen that the Court is of the opinion that the prayer of the Bill 
should be denied, and an order may be drawn accordingly. 
* * * 
ATTACHMENT 7 TO MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE 
COURT OF NOVEMBER 7, 1972 
PRESENTED AND ADOPTED: June 10, 1948 
RESOLUTION 
BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the City of Danville, that the 
purchase of real estate on Route No. 58 from E. L. Adams in amount 
approximating $5200.00 be, and the same is hereby approved. (Material 
on land used for street improvement.) 
ATTEST: 
A. L. Hall 
APPROVED: 
I sl Everett E. Carter 
Mayor 
MOTION 
(Filed November 29, 1972) 
Now comes the plaintiff, Stendig Development Corporation, by 
counsel, and moves the Court to grant a rehearing in this case and states 
as grounds for its motion the following: 
1. The Court's decision is based, in part, on factual assumptions on 
matters concerning which no evidence has been presented to the Court. 
2. The Court's decision was based, in part, on matters which were 
not believed to be in issue and were not argued at the time the case was 
heard on September 27, 1972. 
Respectfully submitted, 
By I sl Walter E. Rogers 
Counsel for the Plaintiff 
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LEITER OPINION OF THE COURT DATED DECEMBER 7, 1972 
Re: Stendig Development Corporation 
v. 
City of Danville 
Gentlemen: 
I have the motion filed by the plaintiff for a rehearing in this matter 
on the grounds that the Court's decision is based on factual assumptions 
on matters concerning which no evidence has been presented, and also 
on matters which are not believed to be in issue and were not argued at 
the time the case was heard on September 27, 1972. 
I have considered the above motions and find that on September 27 
an order was entered stipulating certain exhibits which were primarily 
the minutes of the Council of the City of Danville, and the Declaratory 
Judgment proceedings of City of Danville v. General Development, 
et al, and other matters were agreed upon to be considered by the Court 
as evidence without proof, and that the issues submitted could be decided 
primarily on the exhibits. When the case was argued certain statements 
were made in regard to facts which the Court made notes of and were 
used in the opinion rendered by me on November 7, 1972. 
Mter reviewing my memorandum opinion I think you will find that 
the facts as stated in the opinion were practically all taken from the ex-
hibits and statements made in argument of the case, and in written 
memorandums of agreement. 
For instance, paragraph 1 on page 2 will be found in Exhibit 4 and 
Exhibit 1 which are the minutes of June 10, 1946, and August 12, 1969. 
Paragraph 2 on page 2 was taken from the Bill of Complaint and 
statements by counsel and Exhibit A filed with the Bill. 
On page 3, the last paragraph was taken from Declaratory Judg-
ment proceedings and order, together with Exhibit 3, with the plea of 
res adjudicata, and the balance of this paragraph on page 4 from min-
utes of May 9, 1972, and statement made during argument that General 
Development made the highest bid of $51,000.00. 
Paragraph 2 on page 4 was taken from Exhibit 4 with the Special 
Plea, and the Ordinance of the City of Danville 2-71, and the Consti-
tution of Virginia. The rest of the opinion is based primarily on these 
facts which were agreed to by counsel. 
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For this reason the Court does not feel that there should be a rehear-
ing in this case; there has to be some determination and some end to liti-
gation. 
As to the Court's decision on matters not argued, my experience has 
been that numbers of cases were decided not only by the lower courts 
but by the Court of Appeals on matters which were not argued before 
the Court, but which the Court found was applicable law, and that was 
done in this instance. 
In view of the above proper orders may be drawn overruling this 
motion, and also in accordance with the Memorandum Opinion hereto-
fore rendered. 
Very truly yours, 
Langhorne Jones 
FINAL DECREE 
(Entered December 30, 1972) 
This cause came on this day to be heard upon the Bill of Complaint 
and the Amended Bill of Complaint, the Defendant's Demurrer and De-
murrer to the Amended Bill of Complaint, the Defendant's Special Plea 
and Special Plea to the Amended Bill of Complaint and Defendant's 
Plea of Res Adjudicata; the Exhibits duly filed; the memoranda of 
Counsel; and was argued by Counsel; 
And the Court having rendered its written opinion dated November 
7, 1972, which is made a part hereof by reference, and the plaintiff hav-
ing moved for a rehearing on the grounds that the Court's decision 
appeared to be based, in part, on factual conclusions on matters concern-
ing which no evidence had been presented, and plaintiff's counsel having 
advised the Court that the only factual conclusions they considered not 
supported by the stipulated facts and concerning which the plaintiff de-
sired to present evidence were ( 1) that the plaintiff was represented by 
counsel at the meeting of the City Council of Danville held September 
12, 1969, and (2) that the plaintiff had acquiesced in everything that 
had taken place from the first offer of sale of the property in question 
down to and through the advertisement of the second sale, permitting 
its bid to be used as a starting bid; and the Court, still being of the 
opinion that the prayer of the Amended Bill of Complaint should be de-
nied, even if the plaintiff had not been represented by counsel at said 
App.34 
meeting of the City Counsel, and had not acquiesced in the advertise-
ment of the second sale and had not permitted his bid to be used as a 
starting bid, does, therefore, deny the motion for rehearing; for reasons 
stated in opinion letter of December 7, 1972. 
UPON CONSIDERATION OF ALL OF WHICH, it appearing 
to the Court for the reasons stated in its written opinion of November 7, 
1972, as modified hereby, that the prayer of the Amended Bill of Com-
plaint should be denied and that this suit should be dismissed at plaintiff's 
costs. 
It is accordingly ADJUDGED, ORDERED and DECREED that 
the Prayer of the Amended Bill of Complaint be, and the same hereby 
is, denied, and this case is dismissed at Plaintiff's costs, and it is further 
ORDERED that this cause be removed from the docket. 
To which Order and Decree Plaintiff by Counsel objects and ex-
cepts, as being contrary to the law and the evidence. 
* * * 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
(Filed January 22, 1973) 
1. The Court erred in failing to hold that the City Council of the 
City of Danville accepted the offer of Stendig Development Corporation 
to purchase the "Shale Pit" property ·when it voted six to three in favor 
of the motion to accept such offer at its meeting held September 12, 
1969. 
2. The Court erred in failing to hold that the "Shale Pit" property 
was not public property which required a three-fourths vote of Council 
for its sale and in failing to hold that it could be sold by the affirmative 
vote of a simple majority. 
3. The Court erred in holding that all bids for the purchase of the 
"Shale Pit" property were in fact rejected by the City Council of the 
City of Danville at its meeting held September 19, 1969. 
4. The Court erred in failing to hold that Stendig Development 
Corporation, having been put by the City to the expense of successfully 
defending a declaratory judgment suit to determine if the bids for the 
purchase of the "Shale Pit" property had been properly opened and 
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whether a conflict of interest existed, was equitably entitled to have the 
property conveyed to it at the amount of its bid which was the high bid. 
5. The Court erred in failing to hold that the City of Danville was 
contractually obligated to sell the "Shale Pit" property to Stendig De-
velopment Corporation for $32,000.00 and in failing to decree specific 
performance of the contract. 
6. The Court erred in failing to grant the motion for a rehearing. 
* * * 
